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Under Brand X, federal courts must reverse their own prior precedent in
deference to an intervening agency decision if that agency decision is based on
a reasonable interpretation of the statute. Thus, if the first-in-time court sets the
law at A, and if a second-in-time agency later finds that B is a superior
interpretation of the statute, then the third-in-time court must defer to the
agency and move the law from A to B. But can law B be retroactively applied
to a litigant who reasonably relied on the first-in-time court's opinion that the
law was A? The answer to that question depends on which retroactivity
standard applies to the Brand X problem, which in turn depends on the
answers to two threshold legal questions. First, does the decision to move the
law from A to B "change" the law, or does it merely "clarify" what the law
has always been? Second, if the law has been changed, should that change be
attributed to the second-in-time agency, which offered the "authoritative"
interpretation of the statute, or to the third-in-time court, which decided
whether to ratify that interpretation? Recent decisions have created circuit
splits on both questions, and the Supreme Court has offered little guidance.
This Note argues that a move from A to B does "change" the law, and that the
third-in-time court, rather than the agency, is legally responsible for the
change. In hopes of protecting reasonable litigants from the specter of
retroactivity, this Note then proposes and defends a default rule for federal
courts faced with the Brand X problem. In effect, this proposal would establish
a rebuttable presumption that a small subset of administrative rules-all those
which overrule first-in-time court precedents-should not become operational
unless and until they are ratified by third-in-time federal courts.
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Introduction
In the eight years since it was decided, National Cable &
Telecommunications Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Services' has created a legal
quagmire scarcely rivaled by any Supreme Court case from recent memory.
Although Justice Scalia's dissent correctly predicted that BrandX would create
"a wonderful new world ... full of promise for administrative-law professors in
need of tenure articles,"2 lower court judges and regulated parties have been
less than thrilled with the decision.
The Brand X saga began in the summer of 2003, when the Ninth Circuit
construed the term "telecommunications service," as used in the
Communications Act of 1934, to include a modem service.3 Two years later,
the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) disagreed, finding that
modem service was not a telecommunications service.4 When the issue
returned to the Ninth Circuit following the FCC's ruling, the panel held that the
court of appeals' original construction of the statute would trump the FCC's
contrary opinion.5 The Supreme Court reversed, holding that "[a] court's prior
judicial construction of a statute trumps an agency construction otherwise
entitled to Chevron deference only if the prior court decision holds that its
1. 545 U.S. 967 (2005).
2. Id. at 1019 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
3. AT&T Corp. v. City of Portland, 216 F.3d 871, 876-77 (9th Cir. 2000).
4. Declaratory Ruling and Notice of Proposed Rulernaking In Re Inquiry Concerning
High-Speed Access to the Internet over Cable and Other Facilities, 17 FCC Rcd. 4798, 4831-32 (2002).
5. Brand X Internet Servs. v. FCC, 345 F.3d 1120, 1130 (9th Cir. 2003).
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construction follows from the unambiguous terms of the statute and thus leaves
no room for agency discretion."
One of the most confusing issues raised by Brand X is the interplay
between the court's previous precedent on one hand and the agency's
intervening construction of the statute on the other. Writing for the Court,
Justice Thomas attempted to resolve this tension by noting that the agency, and
not the court, is the "authoritative interpreter" of ambiguous statutes.7 The
agency's power to render an authoritative interpretation, however, does not
mean that the first-in-time court's holding was "legally wrong." Indeed, these
original interpretations may have been both perfectly reasonable and legally
correct. But if the agency prefers a different construction that is also
reasonable, then that construction must ultimately become the law. In so
holding, Brand X obliterated the usual rule of "super-strong" stare decisis for
statutory precedent and "entered some nether world of impermanence hitherto
unknown to our jurisprudence." 10
This "nether world" creates what I call the BrandXproblem. Suppose that
a court makes the law A at T I and that the agency later offers interpretation B at
T2. Under Brand X, a court at T3 is required to make the law B, so long as B is
a reasonable interpretation of the statute. But, when making this change, the T3
court might also seek to retroactively apply law B to a litigant who acted
between TI and T3 in reliance on the TI court's opinion that the law was A.
Thus, the BrandXproblem: should such retroactivity be permitted?
In many instances, the Brand X problem can be avoided if the TI court
remands its case to the relevant agency instead of issuing a provisional
interpretation that might later be overridden. This strategy-the so-called
Ventura remand"-allows courts to interact with the "authoritative
6. BrandX, 545 U.S. at 982.
7. Id. at 983.
8. Id.
9. See Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 172 (1989).
10. William S. Jordan, III, Judicial Review of Informal Statutory Interpretations: The
Answer Is Chevron Step Two, Not Christensen or Mead, 54 ADMIN. L. REv. 719, 724 (2002); see United
States v. Home Concrete & Supply, LLC, 132 S. Ct. 1836, 1846 (2012) (Scalia, J., concurring in part
and concurring in the judgment) ("In cases decided pre-Brand X, the Court had no inkling that it must
utter the magic words 'ambiguous' or 'unambiguous' in order to (poofl) expand or abridge executive
power, and (poofl.) enable or disable administrative contradiction of the Supreme Court.").
11. INS v. Orlando Ventura, 537 U.S. 12, 16 (2002) ("[T]he proper course, except in
rare circumstances, is to remand to the agency for additional investigation or explanation." (internal
quotations omitted)); see Negusie v. Holder, 555 U.S. 511, 523 (2009); Garfias-Rodriguez v. Holder,
702 F.3d 504, 516 n.8 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc) ("Our back-and-forth with the BIA may illustrate the
wisdom of remanding to the BIA where the BIA has not previously interpreted the statute and where we
believe the statute is ambiguous."); Christopher J. Walker, How to Win the Deference Lottery, 91 TEX.
L. REv. SEE ALSO 73, 84 (2013); Kathryn A. Watts, Adapting to Administrative Law's Erie Doctrine,
101 Nw. U. L. REV. 997, 1025-26 (2007). But see Negusie, 555 U.S. at 530-31 (Stevens, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part) (suggesting that the Court should provide its own interpretation and then
remand, rather than remanding in the first instance).
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interpreter," and is similar to a state-certification procedure under Erie.12 But
there are many practical complications with Ventura remands,' 3 especially in
the immigration context.14 And, as of 2013, federal courts seem to avoid them.
This presents a significant problem-and one that is not going away.'5 In
the wake of Brand X, some agencies have settled into an offensive posture,
determined to override adverse court opinions and vindicate their readings of
statutes. The Board of Immigration Appeals (determined to deport) and the
Internal Revenue Service (determined to collect) have gone to war against the
Ninth Circuit (determined to interpret statutes remedially). Many litigants have
been caught in the crossfire of this war, reasonably relying on a TI court
decision only to find that decision yanked out from under them without
warning. Their reliance interests have varied. Aging workers have relied on a
court's first-in-time ruling to structure their retirement plans.16 Thousands of
taxpayers have relied on federal courts' interpretations of the Internal Revenue
Code, only to find several months later that the IRS has overridden that
interpretation and now seeks to apply tax obligations retroactively.17 Still others
have depended on Tl court precedent to accept plea bargains, going as far as to
forfeit constitutional rights in reliance on a first-in-time court's construction of
12. Watts, supra note 11, at 1015; see Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
13. Remand, for example, will not guarantee that the agency ultimately issues a
Chevron-eligible construction, and it won't solve the Brand X problem when the agency itself is a party
in the matter that might otherwise be remanded. See id. at 1030-31. Ventura remands are also expensive
and time-consuming. See Kenneth A. Bamberger, Provisional Precedent: Protecting Flexibility in
Administrative Policymaking, 77 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1272, 1309-10 (2002).
14. Ventura remands do little to solve the BrandXproblem in the immigration context.
This is true because even first-in-time courts of appeals are not always writing on a blank slate. On the
contrary, these courts are sometimes confronted with immigration adjudications that have spoken
directly to the issue but are not entitled to Chevron deference. In such a case, the court of appeals cannot
simply remand the matter to the agency if it disagrees with the agency's construction of the statute.
Instead, the court must offer its own interpretation, since the agency itself has already spoken on the
issue (albeit in a nonprecedential manner).
15. In fact, the problem identified in this Note may grow exponentially depending on
how courts resolve a number of open questions concerning the meaning ofBrandX. See Abbe R. Gluck,
Intrastatutory Federalism and Statutory Interpretation: State Implementation of Federal Law in Health
Reform and Beyond, 121 YALE L.J. 534, 558-59 (2011) ("Does Brand X mean, for example, that a
federal agency interpretation can trump a state court's interpretation of what a federal statutory term
means? How about a state legislature's interpretation-if the state legislature has passed a law to
implement the federal statute based on its understanding of a federal statutory term? On the other side,
could a state agency implementer's interpretation of a federal statute trump a federal judicial
interpretation of that statute under Brand X").
16. See AARP v. EEOC, 390 F. Supp. 2d 437, 443 (E.D. Pa. 2005), aff'd on other
grounds sub nom. Am. Ass'n of Retired Persons v. EEOC, 489 F.3d 558 (3d Cir. 2007).
17. For a fuller dissection of this problem, see Andrew Pruitt, Judicial Deference to
Retroactive Interpretative Treasury Regulations, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1558, 1591, 1169-70 (2011),
which discusses several "loopholes" under which the IRS can impose tax obligations retroactively.
Many think the IRS has become completely untethered in its aggressive use of Brand X for
policymaking purposes. Id. In 2010, for example, the IRS sought to increase collections by adopting a
quirky interpretation of the words "gross income" as used in the Internal Revenue Code,
notwithstanding the fact that the Supreme Court had already issued a contrary construction. See United
States v. Home Concrete & Supply, LLC, 132 S. Ct. 1836, 1842-44 (2012).
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a statute.18 Some have rightly noted that the Brand X problem is "especially
pernicious" in the immigration context.'9 Indeed, TI court decisions often
induce illegal aliens to come out of the shadows and apply for adjustment of
status; after the law changes, the government often uses the same application as
the basis for initiating removal proceedings against the alien.
Given the scope and urgency of this problem, the Ninth Circuit has
bemoaned the total "absence of any guidance from the Supreme Court" on the
retroactivity question.20
This Note provides an answer to the Brand X problem. When ratifying the
agency's T2 interpretation that the law is B, T3 federal courts should assume
that their decisions apply purely prospectively. Thus, law A, and not law B,
should usually apply to litigants who acted at any time between TI and T3.
This rule stays true to Brand X by allowing the opinion of the "authoritative
interpreter" to become law, but also ensures that lay litigants are not punished
for their reasonable reliance on a TI judicial decision.
In hopes of providing the background necessary to understand the Brand
X problem, Part I of this Note offers a brief primer on the federal courts'
existing retroactivity jurisprudence. This Part also introduces and clarifies the
concept of prospectivity.
Part II introduces the Brand X problem through the lens of two recently
decided cases from the federal courts of appeals.
Part III poses and answers two threshold legal questions that are necessary
to determine which retroactivity test is appropriate for the Brand X problem:
whether the law changed, and, if so, who changed it. In hopes of resolving a
circuit split on these questions, I approach the issue by comparing the BrandX
problem with the Erie doctrine.21 Under Erie, a federal court sitting in diversity
is obligated to defer to authoritative state law. But under BrandX, a T3 federal
court is not obligated to defer to the T2 agency interpretation, and may instead
reject any agency interpretation that it finds unreasonable. In light of the federal
courts' ongoing role as gatekeeper, it must be the case that the law does not
actually change until the T2 agency interpretation is ratified by the T3 federal
court.
18. See Nunez-Reyes v. Holder, 646 F.3d 684, 692-94 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc) (noting
that an untold number of aliens, relying on the Ninth Circuit's recently overturned decision in Lujan-
Armendariz v. INS, 222 F.3d 728 (9th Cir. 2000), forfeited their constitutional right to a jury by pleading
guilty to a drug possession charge with the understanding that such a plea would not have adverse
immigration consequences).
19. Elliot Watson, Comment, The Revival of Reliance and Prospectivity: Chevron Oil
in the Immigration Context, 36 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 245, 272 (2012).
20. Garfias-Rodriguez v. Holder, 702 F.3d 504, 520 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc); see
Watson, supra note 19, at 256, 273 (2012) (noting "[t]he Supreme Court's lack of guidance in the area
of civil adjudicative retroactivity" and the "Court's incoherent jurisprudence on the subject").
21. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
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In Part IV, I offer a defense of pure prospectivity. This technique allows
federal courts to apply their new rules of law only to conduct postdating their
decision.
Pure prospectivity is an appropriate response to the Brand X problem for
at least three reasons. First, pure prospectivity allows courts to account for the
fact that the Brand X situation (in which a "correct" judicial interpretation may
be overturned by an agency) is fundamentally different from other cases of
judicial decisionmaking (in which appellate courts reverse lower courts only
because of legal error). Second, a rule of pure prospectivity allows litigants to
act in reasonable reliance on the TI rule between Ti and T3; without such
protection, litigants would be forced to wait in an indefinite limbo while the T2
agency decided whether it wished to overturn the TI rule (and while the T3
court decided whether it wished to ratify the T2 agency construction). And,
third, a contrary rule would unjustly treat litigants who relied on the TI court's
opinion in the same way as litigants who relied on nothing at all, despite the
important dissimilarities between the two situations.
Part IV also shows that the most frequent objections to pure prospectivity
make little sense in the Brand X context. The first of these objections-that
prospectivity promotes judicial activism by relaxing the force of precedent-is
nonsensical in light of the fact that BrandX itself requires courts to abandon the
principle of stare decisis. The second common objection to pure prospectivity is
that it upsets the legal fiction that judges do not "create" law but rather "find"
the law as it has always existed. But this declaratory theory of law breaks down
in a post-Brand X world, since courts are often required to overrule their own
"legally correct" interpretations in deference to a construction "created" by an
administrative agency.
Building on this analysis, Part V suggests that T3 federal courts
confronted with the Brand X problem should presume that their decision to
move the law from A to B applies purely prospectively. The result of such a
presumption is that law A will usually apply to litigants who acted before T3,
and law B will usually apply to litigants who acted after T3. In effect, this
proposal would require that a small subset of administrative rules-all those
that overrule court precedents predating the rule's promulgation-must be
ratified by a third-in-time federal court before they become operational.22
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22. This proposal applies only to T2 agency opinions, and therefore would not affect
the vast majority of agency statutory interpretation, which occurs before a court has weighed in on the
precise issue that the agency is considering. Moreover, my proposal is only a default rule. For discussion
of one situation in which the default rule might be displaced, see infra note 164.
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I. Existing Retroactivity Jurisprudence
As a general matter, "[r]etroactivity is not favored in the law." 23
Motivated by the principles of due process and basic fairness, the Supreme
Court has held that the Constitution requires that individuals "have an
opportunity to know what the law is and to conform their conduct
accordingly." 24 Thus, when some new rule purports to be retroactive-that is,
when it "attaches new legal consequences to events completed before its
enactment-25-courts proceed from the assumption that the rule cannot be
applied to past conduct.
Over the past century, the Supreme Court has given that presumption
shape by adopting particularized rules to determine if and when new rules can
be applied retroactively. Some of those tests are fairly straightforward. After
Landgraf v. USI Film Products, for example, it is black letter law that new
legislation may not be applied retroactively absent explicit direction in the
26statute. But things get more complicated from there. Especially in the area of
judicial decisionmaking, the relevant law is uncommonly complex. The pages
below offer a brief primer on retroactivity in courts and agencies.
A. The Judicial Retroactivity Cases
A federal court announcing a new rule of law theoretically has three
options regarding the potential application of that rule: full retroactivity,
selective prospectivity, and pure prospectivity. Full retroactivity, which applies
the new rule against the instant parties and all future litigants, "is
overwhelmingly the norm." 27 Selective prospectivity allows "a court [to] apply
a new rule in the case in which it is pronounced, [but] then return to the old one
with respect to all others arising on facts predating the pronouncement." 28 This
technique, pioneered by the Warren Court,29 was definitively rejected in
Harper v. Virginia Department of Taxation (1993).30 The final technique,
called pure prospectivity, announces a new rule of law but applies that new rule
23. Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 208 (1988).
24. Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 265 (1994).
25. Id. at 270.
26. Id. at 272-73.
27. James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529, 535 (1991).
28. Id. at 537.
29. See, e.g., Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967); see also Beam, 501 U.S. at 537
(collecting cases); Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law, Non-Retroactivity, and
Constitutional Remedies, 104 HARV. L. REv. 1731, 1738-44 (1991) (discussing Warren Court
retroactivity jurisprudence).
30. 509 U.S. 86, 97 (1993).
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neither to the instant litigants nor to any other party whose conduct predated the
court's decision.3 1
The validity of pure prospectivity has been a divisive issue for decades.
The Court's opinions on this topic have been described generously as
"somewhat chaotic," 32 and, not so generously, as the "jurisprudential equivalent
of entropy."33
Much of this confusion results from the fact that the term "prospectivity"
captures two independent concepts, each with a distinct doctrinal justification.
The first concept uses prospectivity as a choice-of-law rule. On this view, a
court that reverses precedent A and adopts new rule B will apply law A to all
parties who acted when A was in force, but will apply law B to all conduct
following the date of the court's decision. The second concept uses
prospectivity as a remedial rule. On this view, the court will apply law B to all
conduct-past and present-but may invoke its equitable powers to prevent the
full consequences of law B from attaching to conduct that occurred when law A
was in force. 34
Both conceptions are faithful to the goals of Benjamin Cardozo,3 5 who
pioneered the technique of prospectivity in hopes of protecting litigants from
the retroactive effect of a judicial decision reversing clear precedent on which
the litigant had relied.36 But there are, of course, important differences between
the two theories of prospectivity. The choice-of-law conception is highly
positivist, and the remedial conception is unabashedly realist. It is the latter
conception-which dates at least to Justice John Marshall Harlan II37-that has
enjoyed the most support in the academy. Professors Fallon and Meltzer, for
example, persuasively argued in 1991 that the "simpler, remedial
characterization is far more apt."38
The tension between these two conceptions of prospectivity came to a
head in American Trucking Ass'ns v. Smith (1990).39 There, Justice Stevens and
three colleagues argued that pure prospectivity was permissible as a remedial
31. Beam, 501 U.S. at 536.
32. Harper, 509 U.S. at 113 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
33. Id. at 114; see also Note, Confusion in Federal Courts: Application of the Chevron
Test in Retroactive-Prospective Decisions, 1985 U. ILL. L. REv. 117, 128-36.
34. William Michael Treanor & Gene B. Sperling, Prospective Overruling and the
Revival of "Unconstitutional" Statutes, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1902, 1932-33 & n.115, 1937 (1993).
35. See BENJAMIN N. CARDOzO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 146-47
(1921) (citations omitted).
36. Id.; see Great Northern R.R. Co. v. Sunburst Oil & Refining Co., 287 U.S. 358, 364
(1932).
37. See United States v. Estate of Donnelly, 397 U.S. 286, 296-97 (1970) (Harlan, J.,
concurring); Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 257-58 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
38. Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 29, at 1768.




tool but was impermissible as a choice-of-law rule.40 Justice O'Connor, also
joined by three colleagues, argued that Justice Stevens had it "precisely
backwards," and that prospectivity should be used as a choice-of-law rule in
order to avoid "real and inequitable hardships in many cases."41
This disagreement was motivated by profound uncertainty over the
meaning of the Court's decision in Chevron Oil v. Huson (1971).42 That case
allows federal courts to deny retroactive application to a new rule of law if
retroactivity would impose undue "injustice or hardship" to the litigant.43 In
order to make that determination, Chevron Oil presents a three-part test.4
Those three factors are: (1) whether the decision to be applied retroactively
establishes a new principle of law; (2) whether retroactive application of the
new rule would further or retard the operation of the rule in light of its history
and purpose; and (3) whether retroactivity would produce substantial
inequity.45
In her American Trucking opinion, Justice O'Connor cited to Chevron Oil
for the proposition that prospectivity is permitted as a choice-of-law rule. In her
view, Chevron Oil means that, at least sometimes, "a court should apply the
law prevailing at the time of the conduct."46 Justice Stevens dissented, claiming
that Chevron Oil established a test for which remedy should be applied, rather
47than a test for which law should be applied. Justice Stevens, drawing a
comically unhelpful analogy between "retroactive effect" and "retroactive
effect," argued that a new rule of law always applied to the instant litigants.48
But just because the new law applied did not mean that it had the effect of
applying.
The year after American Trucking was decided, Chevron Oil was at least
partially overruled by James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia (1991). 49 In that
case, a majority disapproved of selective prospectivity, but there was no
opinion for the Court.50 Selective retroactivity was not definitively rejected
until Harper was decided two Terms later.5 1
40. Id. at 218-19 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
41. Id. at 184 (plurality opinion).
42. 404 U.S. 97 (1971).
43. Id. at 106-07 (quoting Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701, 706 (1969)).
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. American Trucking, 496 U.S. at 191.
47. Id. at 214 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
48. Id. at 209.
49. 501 U.S. 529 (1991).
50. Id. at 540.
51. Harper v. Va. Dep't of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86, 97 (1993); accord Rivers v. Roadway
Express, 511 U.S. 298, 312-13 (1994).
227
Yale Journal on Regulation
By banning selective prospectivity, Harper and Beam clearly overruled
the section of Chevron Oil that called for a case-by-case test.52 But even in the
wake of these decisions, federal courts are not necessarily obligated to apply all
new rules of law retroactively. Although these cases foreclose any option for
selective prospectivity, they leave open the question of whether an option of
pure prospectivity exists-that is, whether a court may choose to apply a new
rule of law to future litigants only.53
In Beam, the Court split in an impressive four directions on the validity of
pure prospectivity. Four Justices felt that pure prospectivity was sometimes
appropriate,54 three Justices felt that pure prospectivity was unconstitutional,s
and two Justices declined to "speculate as to the bounds or propriety of pure
prospectivity."56 It was, fittingly, the opinion of two that spoke for the Court.
When Harper was decided the next year, things got even more confusing.
Justice Thomas wrote an opinion for five Justices hinting that pure
prospectivity was unconstitutional. This might have settled the pure-
prospectivity question once and for all if this observation had been necessary to
the holding of the Court. Alas, the vote here was somewhat without meaning,
58given that the issue of pure prospectivity was mere dictum.
The Court's most recent journey into the retroactivity thicket was
Reynoldsville Casket Co. v. Hyde (1995).5 The Respondents in that case
advanced the remedial conception of prospectivity championed by Professors
Fallon and Meltzer. Justice Breyer's opinion for a unanimous Court
acknowledged that the remedial argument was "ingenuous [],,6o but nonetheless
held that litigants who "offer[] no more than simple reliance"61 cannot avoid
the application of Harper merely by arguing that the denial of relief was "based
52. See Harper, 509 US. at 97 (noting that the new rule would "prevail[] over any claim
based on a Chevron Oil analysis" (internal quotation marks omitted)); Beam, 501 U.S. at 540.
53. See I LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 3-3, at 226 (3d ed.
2000) (noting that the Harper Court simply "did not hold that all decisions of federal law must
necessarily be applied retroactively" and explaining that the Supreme Court has never expressly
"renounced the power to make its decisions entirely prospective, so that they do not apply even to the
parties before it").
54. Beam, 501 U.S. at 550 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); id. at 546 (White, J., concurring
in the judgment).
55. Id. at 547 (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 549 (Scalia, J.,
concurring in the judgment).
56. Id. at 544 (Souter, J., opinion of the Court).
57. Harper, 509 U.S. at 97; id. at 94 (noting that "[n]othing in the Constitution alters
the fundamental rule of" retroactivity).
58. See id. at 116 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); see also Jill E. Fisch, Retroactivity and
Legal Change: An Equilibrium Approach, 110 HARv. L. REv. 1055, 1062 (1997) (discussing this
dictum).
59. 514 U.S. 749 (1995).
60. Id. at 752.




on 'remedy' rather than 'non-retroactivity."' 62 The Reynoldsville Casket
decision "cast[s] doubt on the permissibility of invoking remedial discretion to
deny relief for the violation of a 'novel' constitutional rule." 63
In seeking to vindicate the remedial conception of prospectivity, the
Respondents in Reynoldsville Casket attempted to draw two analogies to other
areas of the law. One of these analogies was to collateral review of state court
criminal convictions. Here, the Respondents cited to Teague v. Lane, in which
the Court had held that a petitioner generally cannot receive federal habeas
relief if such relief requires the habeas court to retroactively apply a rule of law
that had not yet been established at the time of the petitioner's conviction.
The second analogy was to qualified immunity. Under that doctrine, public
officials cannot be held liable under legal principles that were not "clearly
established" at the time of their conduct.65 The Respondents argued that the
application of this rule necessarily required a departure from Harper, since a
rule of full retroactivity would subject these officials to liability under the later-
established law.
The Court quickly dismissed the habeas analogy by reasoning that the
Teague doctrine represents not a remedial view of prospectivity but rather an
overriding concern for protecting finality.66 But the Court had trouble
distinguishing the qualified-immunity example. Ultimately, Justice Breyer
admitted that qualified-immunity doctrine "reflect[ed] certain remedial
considerations," but held that such considerations were justified only by the
"special federal policy considerations" at play in the qualified-immunity
context.67
The lasting significance of Reynoldsville Casket is that a unanimous Court
agreed that Harper does not apply to all cases. Although "simple reliance" is
not enough to avoid retroactivity, the Court noted cryptically that litigants "may
or may not",6 be able to avoid retroactivity if they can show both a reliance
interest and some "special circumstance" or "policy consideration" that makes
retroactivity unfair.69 Justice Breyer was less than forthcoming about precisely
62. Id. at 754.
63. RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS
AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 722 (6th ed., 2009) [hereinafter FALLON ET AL., FEDERAL COURTS]. It is
worth noting that Reynoldsville Casket involved the retroactive application of a new constitutional rule,
which is not precisely analogous to the BrandXproblem. But the case for nonretroactivity may actually
be stronger when dealing with statutes as opposed to constitutional law. See id. (discussing this
difference).
64. 489 U.S. 288, 305-08 (1989).
65. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
66. Reynoldsville Casket, 514 U.S. at 758 (noting that the Teague principle represents
not a remedial view but rather "a limitation inherent in the [retroactivity] principle itself').
67. Id. Applying Harper to the qualified-immunity context would eliminate such
immunity, which in turn would disincentivize public service and impose enormous litigation costs.
68. Id. at 754.
69. Id. at 758-59.
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what "special circumstance[s]" are needed to avoid Harper, suggesting only
that the question would depend on "the kind of case, matter, and circumstances
involved." 70 In the pages below, I hope to show that the Brand X problem is
exactly such a "special circumstance," and that a T3 federal court would
therefore be within its authority to apply its new rule purely prospectively.
Although Reynoldsville Casket did provide helpful clues about the
contours of Harper, it did not cleanly resolve the question of whether Chevron
Oil is still good law. Indeed, less than a month after Reynoldsville Casket was
decided, the Court expressly acknowledged ambiguity over "the continuing
validity of Chevron Oil after Harper ... and Reynoldsville Casket."7'
In light of "the Supreme Court's uncertain compass in charting" this area
of the law,72 it is not surprising that the courts of appeals have divided over the
legitimacy of pure prospectivity. The Ninth and Eleventh Circuits have upheld
the ongoing validity of Chevron Oil, both in en banc cases.73 The D.C. Circuit
has held that Chevron Oil is now bad law and that pure prospectivity is never
permissible.74 The Fifth Circuit believes that Chevron Oil has been repudiated,
but that Harper leaves open the possibility of "pure prospectivity in an
extremely unusual and unforeseeable case."75 The Third Circuit has gone no
further than to state the obvious: that the question is "unclear."76 The Fourth
Circuit had suggested that there is "serious doubt" as to the ongoing validity of
Chevron Oil, but has noted that it was "struck . . . by the notable absence in
Harper of any statement that Chevron [Oil] is overruled."77
70. Id. at 755.
71. Ryder v. United States, 515 U.S. 177, 184-85 (1995); see FALLON ET AL., FEDERAL
COURTS, supra note 63, at 54 n.3 (noting the Court's "evolution" from the "flexible test" of Chevron Oil
towards the current doctrine, under which "the Court now permits little if any nonretroactive judicial
decisionmaking").
72. Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 29, at 1757.
73. See, e.g., Nunez-Reyes v. Holder, 646 F.3d 684, 692 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc)
(noting that the Ninth Circuit "remain[s] bound by Chevron Oil" because it had not yet been "explicitly
overruled"); see also id. at 698 (Ikuta, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("Although the
reasons for severely limiting non-retroactive decision-making are clearly set out in Harper, the Court
did not expressly overrule Chevron Oil. We therefore must continue to consider Chevron Oil where we
are announcing a new rule of law for the first time and the parties have fairly raised the issue."); Glazner
v. Glazner, 347 F.3d 1212, 1216-17 (1lth Cir. 2003) (en banc) ("Although prospectivity appears to have
fallen into disfavor with the Supreme Court, . . . the Court has clearly retained the possibility of pure
prospectivity and, we believe, has also retained the Chevron Oil test, albeit in a modified form, as the
governing analysis for such determinations in civil cases."). But see Morales-Izquierdo v. Dep't of
Homeland Sec., 600 F.3d 1076, 1087-90 (9th Cir. 2010) (declining to apply Chevron Oil and instead
applying the Harper presumption favoring retroactivity).
74. United Food & Commercial Workers Int'l Union, Local No. 150-A v. NLRB, I
F.3d 24, 35 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
75. Hulin v. Fibreboard Corp., 178 F.3d 316, 333 (5th Cir. 1999).
76. See, e.g., Kolkevich v. Att'y Gen. of U.S., 501 F.3d 323, 337 n.9 (3d Cir. 2007).





Part of the reason this area of the law is so confusing is because there is no
unambiguous, agreed-upon language with which to discuss the relevant issues.
Judges often state they are "against" pure prospectivity, but do not say whether
they a're against a choice-of-law rule or a remedial rule or both, or whether
they a're against pure prospectivity or selective prospectivity or both, or
whether they have constitutional or policy-based objections or both.
In hopes of avoiding this type of confusion, a quick note on my argument
is warranted. I do not take sides in the debate over the proper conception of
prospectivity.78 Rather, I hope to show that, under either the remedial or the
choice-of-law theory, litigants who have fallen victim to the Brand X problem
should not be subject to retroactive application of the agency's interpretation.
Those who favor a robust remedial conception of prospectivity, such as Justice
Stevens, should want to invoke the court's equitable powers to protect litigants
who reasonably relied on the Tl court's interpretation. Those who reject
remedial prospectivity except in certain "special circumstances," such as
Justice Breyer, should hold that the Brand X problem involves "policy
consideration[s]" that justify pure prospectivity.79 Finally, those who favor the
choice-of-law theory of prospectivity, such as Justice O'Connor, should find
that, on balance, the equities dictate that the T3 court's opinion should apply
prospectively only.
B. The Agency Retroactivity Cases
The Supreme Court has provided somewhat different retroactivity rules
when an agency, rather than a court, has changed the law.
1. Retroactivity of Rulemakings
In Bowen v. Georgetown University Hospital (1988), the Court held that
Congress and administrative agencies (but not courts) must make a clear
statement if they wish their new rules to operate retroactively. Barring such a
statement, federal courts will make a default presumption of non-retroactivity. 8 1
Justice Scalia, concurring in the Court's judgment, found that this default rule
78. This issue has already been discussed extensively in the literature and is beyond the
scope of my Note. If I were litigating a case involving the Brand X problem, I would probably urge the
Court to hold that BrandX involves exactly the type of "special circumstances" that can justify remedial
prospectivity under Reynoldsville Casket. This approach does justice to the Court's case law by
acknowledging that pure prospectivity is an usual remedy that can only be invoked in extraordinary
circumstances. Although the choice-of-law theory is attractive, it is ultimately less persuasive than the
remedial conception. See, e.g., Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 29, at 1743-46; Treanor & Sperling, supra
note 34, at 1918.
79. See, e.g., Reynoldsville Casket Co. v. Hyde, 514 U.S. 749, 758-59 (1995).
80. 488 U.S. 204 (1988).
81. Id. at 208.
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was compelled by the Administrative Procedure Act's definition of the word
"rule," which provides that only an "agency statement of general or particular
applicability and future effect" will qualify.82
The Court considered the scope of this presumption in Smiley v. Citibank
(1996). In that case, a California court dismissed a suit in which the plaintiff
had alleged that her credit card company charged her excessive fees. While a
direct appeal was pending, a federal agency adopted a regulation clarifying that
the ambiguous term "interest" in the National Bank Act included late fees. The
plaintiff argued that the new rule could not be applied retroactively to resolve
her case. The Supreme Court disagreed, noting that
[t]here might be substance to [an argument against retroactivity] if the regulation
replaced a prior agency interpretation-which, as we have discussed, it did not.
Where, however, a court is addressing transactions that occurred at a time when
there was no clear agency guidance, it would be absurd to ignore the agency's
84
current authoritative pronouncement of what the statute means.
After Bowen and Smiley, the critical question in evaluating the retroactive
application of agency rulemakings is whether the new rule "changes" the law or
merely "clarifies" the law as it existed before the rulemaking. If the rule
"changes" the law, it cannot be applied retroactively; if the rule "clarifies" the
law, then retroactivity analysis is not implicated, since the law was the same
both before and after the regulation. At least eight courts of appeals have
employed some version of a change-versus-clarify analysis.85 The Third Circuit
and the D.C. Circuit have even developed elaborate tests to make this
82. 5 U.S.C. § 551(4) (2012) (emphasis added); see Bowen, 488 U.S. at 216-17 (Scalia,
J., concurring).
83. 517 U.S. 735 (1996).
84. Id. at 744 n.3; see also FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 515
(2009) ("[T]he agency need not always provide a more detailed justification [for a policy change] than
what would suffice for a new policy created on a blank slate. Sometimes it must-when, for example ...
its prior policy has engendered serious reliance interests that must be taken into account. It would be
arbitrary or capricious to ignore such matters" (internal citations omitted)). Professor Watts has
interpreted note 3 in Smiley to mean that "if a [new] rule simply clarifies legal principles that were in
effect when the complained of conduct occurred, application of the rule cannot be viewed as
impermissibly retroactive." Watts, supra note 11, at 1031 n. 196. In the BrandX context, however, more
than just "legal principles" were in effect when the litigant detrimentally relied-there was also a circuit
court decision on point. Watts appears to cite Smiley for a slightly different point: if a federal court had
not yet issued an interpretation of the statute, it could remand the question to the agency under Ventura,
have the agency develop a rule, and then retroactively apply that rule, all without violating the
Constitution.




determination. Other courts of appeals have deferred to the agency's opinion
on the question of whether the new rule "changes" or "clarifies" the law.87
2. Retroactivity of Adjudications
The leading case in the area of adjudicative retroactivity is SEC v.
Chenery Corp. (1947), in which the Supreme Court held that:
retroactivity must be balanced against the mischief of producing a result which
is contrary to a statutory design or to legal and equitable principles. If that
mischief is greater than the ill effect of the retroactive application of a new
standard, it is not the type of retroactivity which is condemned by law.
88
Courts have struggled to interpret Chenery. In particular, judges have had
trouble balancing the Chenery factors in a way that leads to predictable and
uniform results. In hopes of solving that problem, the D.C. Circuit developed a
Chenery-based multi-factor test in Retail, Wholesale & Department Store
Union v. NLRB (1972).8 9 Retail Union presents a defendant-friendly test for
determining whether retroactivity is appropriate when an agency changes the
law.90 The Ninth Circuit has joined three other courts of appeals in adopting the
Retail Union balancing test to deal with situations in which a "new
administrative policy [is] announced and implemented through adjudication." 9'
By establishing a firm presumption against retroactivity, Retail Union has
successfully mediated between an agency's occasional need to change its
position and a regulated party's need to reasonably rely on existing rules. 92
86. See id. at 506-07; Nat'l Mining Ass'n v. Dep't of Labor, 292 F.3d 849, 860 (D.C.
Cir. 2002).
87. See, e.g., Heimmermann v. First Union Mortg. Corp., 305 F.3d 1257, 1260 (11 th
Cir. 2002) ("While not dispositive, an agency's determination that a new statement is a clarification of
existing law, rather than an entirely new rule, is generally given much weight."); Pope v. Shalala, 998
F.2d 473, 485 (7th Cir. 1993). But see Levy H1, 544 F.3d at 507 ("[W]e do not consider an enacting
body's description of an amendment as a 'clarification' of the pre-amendment law to necessarily be
relevant to the judicial analysis.").
88. 332 U.S. 194, 203 (1947).
89. 466 F.2d 380 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
90. Id. at 390. It is worth noting that both Chenery and Retail Union predate the
Supreme Court's case law eliminating an option for selective prospectivity in the judicial context. When
given the chance, the Court may hold that selective prospectivity is impermissible not just in judicial
opinions, but also in the adjudication context. This would create an easily applicable bright line rule, but
would displace much of the existing precedent from the courts of appeals.
91. Montgomery Ward & Co. v. FTC, 691 F.2d 1322, 1328 (9th Cir. 1982); see id.
(applying the Retail Union factors and noting that, as a general matter, "the agency may act through
adjudication to clarify an uncertain area of the law, so long as the retroactive impact of the clarification
is not excessive or unwarranted"). The Retail Union test has also been adopted by the Second, Third,
and Fifth Circuits. See McDonald v. Watt, 653 F.2d 1035, 1043-46 (5th Cir. Unit A Aug. 1981); E.L.
Wiegand Division v. NLRB, 650 F.2d 463, 471 & n.5 (3d Cir. 1981); Lodges 743 & 1746, Int'l Ass'n of
Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. United Aircraft Corp., 534 F.2d 422, 452-54 (2d Cir. 1975).
92. Watson, supra note 19, at 257.
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II. Two Approaches to the BrandX Problem
Given the complexities of the Supreme Court's retroactivity
jurisprudence, the two courts of appeals that have confronted the Brand X
problem could be forgiven for their confusion.
A. The Ninth Circuit Approach93
The Ninth Circuit saga begins with a statute as confusing as the Brand X
problem itself: the Immigration and Nationality Act. Section 245(i) of the Act
allows aliens who entered the United States without inspection to adjust their
status to lawful permanent resident. 94 But section 212(a)(9)(C)(i)(I) of the same
Act provides that no alien who had been unlawfully present in the United States
for more than a year is eligible for adjustment of status. 95 Thus, "the plain
language of the [Act] seem[ed] to make 'entry without inspection' both a
qualifying and a disqualifying condition for adjustment of status." 96
The first decisionmaker to weigh in on this conflict was the Ninth Circuit,
which held in Acosta v. Gonzales that adjustment of status under section 245(i)
was available to aliens who were otherwise inadmissible under section
212(a)(9)(C)(i)(I). 97
The year after Acosta was handed down, the Board of Immigration
Appeals (BIA) decided Matter of Briones. In that case, the BIA reached a
conclusion that was exactly opposite to Acosta: aliens inadmissible under
section 212(a)(9)(C)(i)(I) could not seek adjustment of status.98
When the issue returned to the Ninth Circuit in Garfias-Rodriguez v.
Holder,99 the panel decided that Briones was a reasonable interpretation of the
93. For the sake of clarity, my summary of the Garfias litigation leaves out a few
details. For example, I do not discuss a similar line of litigation that interprets the sister provision of the
statute at issue in Garfias. In those cases, the Ninth Circuit construed sections 245(i) and
212(a)(9)(C)(i)(II) of the Act to allow for adjustment of status. Perez-Gonzales v. Ashcroft, 379 F.3d
783, 788-92 (2004). The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) later reversed that opinion. Matter of
Torres-Garcia, 23 I. & N. Dec. 866, 868 (BIA 2006). When a petition for review of Torres-Garcia
reached the Ninth Circuit, that court became the first in the country to overrule its own previous
precedent in deference to an intervening agency decision under Brand X. Gonzales v. Dep't of
Homeland Sec., 508 F.3d 1227, 1242-43 (9th Cir. 2007).
94. 8 U.S.C. § 1255(i) (2012).
95. Id. § 182(a)(9)(C) (2012).
96. Matter of Briones, 24 I. & N. Dec. 355, 362 (BIA 2007) (discussing the section of
the INA at issue in Perez-Gonzales, which was the sister provision of the section at issue in Garfias).
See supra note 93.
97. 439 F.3d 550, 558 (9th Cir. 2006).
98. Briones, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 361-71. In Briones, the BIA expressly declined to
decide whether to apply its new rule in the Ninth Circuit. Id. at 372, n.9. This hesitation is explained by
Acosta, which had already established the opposite rule. Three years after Briones, the BIA announced
in Matter of Diaz and Lopez that it would apply its interpretation to cases arising in the Ninth Circuit
pursuant to its authority under BrandX. 25 1. & N. Dec. 188, 190-91 (2010).




statute. Citing Brand X, the court overruled its previous opinion in Acosta in
deference to the agency's opinion in Briones.00
But that was not the end of the matter. The T3 panel was also faced with
the difficult question of whether it could retroactively apply the T2 Briones rule
to Francisco Javier Garfias-Rodriguez ("Garfias"), given that he had relied on
the TI court's decision in Acosta. 101 Garfias's counsel argued that retroactivity
was impermissible, citing to the substantial reliance interests of his client and
other aliens similarly situated. Those reliance interests varied, but usually
included substantial legal and application fees. And, in many instances,
undocumented immigrants had come out of hiding in reliance on Acosta, only
to find that they might now be deported under Briones.
The Garfias panel, believing itself bound by a previous Ninth Circuit
decision that permitted this type of retroactivity,102 found that Briones could be
applied retroactively against those who had relied on Acosta. This holding
appeared to create an intra-circuit split with yet another Ninth Circuit case:
Nunez-Reyes v. Holder.103 In Nunez-Reyes, an en banc panel declined to apply
its decision overruling previous circuit precedent to the instant litigant, noting
that such retroactivity would upset notions of basic fairness and notice. In light
of the Ninth Circuit's muddled case law, the Ninth Circuit voted to grant en
banc review in Garfias.104
The Garfias en banc panel was understandably confused. Their case might
have been governed by any of three competing lines of case law: (1) the
Supreme Court's general retroactivity jurisprudence, as announced in Harper
100. Id. at 949.
101. At this point, it is worth noting I have described the events at issue in Garfias in
the order that the majority opinion describes them, rather than as they really happened. In reality, the
first event in the sequence was not the Acosta decision. As it turns out, Garfias's original application for
adjustment of status was filed four years before Acosta was decided. In reality, the first decisionmaker to
weigh in on Garfias's case was an immigration judge, who held that Garfias was ineligible for
adjustment of status. Garfias appealed that decision to the BIA. While his appeal was pending, the Ninth
Circuit decided Acosta. Thus, Garfias did not really "rely" on Acosta at all; indeed, it would have been
impossible for him to do so. At the Ninth Circuit, his attorneys claimed that Garfias's "reliance interest"
took the form of a fee to renew his existing application in light of Acosta. This is nonsense. Since Acosta
had not been decided at the time Garfias applied to adjust status, Chief Judge Kozinski was correct to
note that Garfias was simply "not situated similarly to the class of individuals who applied for
adjustment of status after Acosta and before Briones." Garfias-Rodriguez v. Holder, 702 F.3d 504, 530
(9th Cir. 2012) (en banc) (Kozinski, C.J., disagreeing with everyone). In fact, the Garfias majority was
totally unable to identify any reliance interest held by Garfias that would have triggered a retroactivity
analysis. See, e.g., id. at 516 n.9 (majority opinion). I adopt Garfias as a lens for examining the Brand X
problem not because the litigant is emblematic of the injustices that this problem can reap; he is not. But
Garfias does show an en banc court struggling with the BrandXproblem, and the opinions represent the
most recent and most thorough dissection of the issue.
102. See Morales-Izquierdo v. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 600 F.3d 1076, 1087 (9th Cir.
2010).
103. 646 F.3d 684 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc).
104. 672 F.3d 1125 (9th Cir. 2012).
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and Beam; (2) the Supreme Court's exceptions to that rule, as announced in
Chevron Oil and Reynoldsville Casket; or (3) the Retail Union test.
The Ninth Circuit could decide which of these three tests to apply only
after answering two threshold legal questions: whether the law had been
changed, and, if so, who changed it. If the law had not been changed, no
retroactivity analysis would have been appropriate. If the law had been
changed, then the question of who changed it would govern which test applied.
Ten of eleven judges agreed that Briones, by effectively reversing the
circuit precedent of Acosta, had "changed" the law.105 But on the second
question, confusion reigned. In his opinion for the majority, Judge Bybee-a
former administrative law professor-noted that
the Brand X twist here complicates the situation somewhat: because we have
determined that our prior decision in Acosta must be overruled in light of the
BIA's decision in Briones, it is not clear whether we, as a judicial
decisionmaker, have changed the law, or whether it is the agency that has
changed the law. Thus, there are two ossible answers to the retroactivity
question: [Chevron Oil] or [Retail Union].
The en banc panel fractured badly over that question. Judge Bybee's
opinion for a seven-member majority found that Retail Union was the proper
framework and that retroactivity was appropriate.1o7 Judge Paez and Judge
Reinhardt dissented, finding that Chevron Oil was the proper framework and
that retroactivity was inappropriate. os Judge Gould agreed with the dissent that
Chevron Oil was the proper framework, but agreed with the majority that
retroactivity should attach.109 Judge Graber wrote that it was "a close question
whether [Chevron Oil] or [Retail Union] provides the better framework" but
that, "under either framework, retroactive application of the new legal rule is
appropriate." Chief Judge Kozinski-captioning his opinion a
"disagree[ment] with everyone"-thought the whole project of a retroactivity
105. Everyone but Chief Judge Kozinski agreed that Garfias changed the law. See, e.g.,
Garfias-Rodriguez, 702 F.3d at 514 n.7 (majority opinion) (noting that the court's decision "effectively
brought about the change in the law"); id. at 533 (Gould., J., concurring) ("[I]t is unmistakable that our
decision establishes a new principle of law because we overrule clear precedent established by Acosta v.
Gonzales."); id. at 550 (Paez, J., dissenting) ("There is no question that we announce a new rule of law
in overruling Acosta in deference to Briones."); accord Nunez-Reyes v. Holder, 646 F.3d 684, 692 (9th
Cir. 2011) ("There is no question that our decision today establish[es] a new principle of law ... by
overruling clear past precedent on which litigants may have relied." (internal quotations omitted)).
106. Garfias-Rodriguez, 702 F.3d at 504. It is not clear why the en banc panel did not
give more consideration to the Harper rule, especially in light of its recent application in Morales-
Izquierdo, 600 F.3d at 1088.
107. Id. at 517-20.
108. Id. at 550 (Paez, J., dissenting).
109. Id. at 532-33 (Gould, J., concurring).




analysis was unnecessary given the facts of the case.11 Before signing off,
Chief Judge Kozinski took a final swing at the panel, noting that, "[a]s an en
banc court, we have a responsibility to bring clarity to our law. By the time
lawyers in this circuit get through reading all of our opinions, they'll be
thoroughly confused."ll 2
B. The Third Circuit Approach
Unlike the Ninth Circuit, the Third Circuit's treatment of this issue has
been somewhat terse and conclusory.
In the derivative suit Levy v. Sterling Holding Co. (Levy 1), an LLC's
managers sought disgorgement of short-swing profits under the Exchange Act
of 1934. The LLC claimed that certain obscure provisions of the Act exempted
them from liability. The Third Circuit disagreed, finding that the LLC was not
exempt and that the profits should be distributed. The SEC, which has authority
to interpret and implement the Exchange Act, then promulgated a rule
clarifying that the LLC was exempt.113 When the issue returned to the Third
Circuit in Levy II, the court deferred to the SEC's regulations under Brand X.114
Faced with the now-familiar Brand X problem, the Third Circuit was
confronted with the same two threshold questions: whether the law had
changed, and, if so, who changed it.
The court never gave direct treatment to the question of who changed the
law. But, by applying a test derived from administrative-law cases, the Third
Circuit made clear that it thought the agency, and not the court, was responsible
for the change. The court did not consider the fact that its opinion validating the
SEC Rule, rather than the SEC Rule itself, was responsible for the formal shift
away from Levy I.
In hopes of answering the question of whether the law had been changed
or merely clarified, the Third Circuit developed an elaborate four-part test. That
test asked
(1) whether the text of the old regulation was ambiguous; (2) whether the new
regulation resolved, or at least attempted to resolve, that ambiguity; (3) whether
the new regulation's resolution of the ambiguity is consistent with the text of the
old regulation; and (4) whether the new regulation's resolution of the ambiguity
is consistent with the agency's prior treatment of the issue." 5
111. Id. at 529-32 (Kozinski, C.J., disagreeing with everyone); see supra note 101.
112. Id. at 532.
113. 70 Fed. Reg. 46,080 (Aug. 9, 2005).
114. Levy v. Sterling Holding Co., LLC (Levy II), 544 F.3d 493, 495 (3d Cir. 2008).
115. Id. at 507 (internal citations omitted).
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Applying this test, the Third Circuit found that the old rule was ambiguous, that
the new rule resolved the ambiguity, that the new rule was somewhat consistent
with the old rule, and that the new rule was consistent with the SEC's prior
understanding.116 Given these conclusions, the Third Circuit found that the new
rule had clarified rather than changed the law.
III. Threshold Questions
In order to develop a rule that will govern the Brand X problem, any court
will first need legally sound answers to two threshold questions.
First, the court will need to establish whether the law of the circuit has
been changed when a court of appeals overrules prior precedent in deference to
an intervening agency opinion. The Supreme Court has indicated that
retroactivity analysis is only proper when some rule "attaches new legal
consequences to events [that were] completed" before the rule became
operative.117 Thus, if the law has not been changed, then no retroactivity
analysis is appropriate. When considering the Brand X problem, some have
argued that the agency's view at T2 (as ratified by the T3 court) does not
"change" the law in the manner required to trigger retroactivity analysis.
This argument is premised on the idea that there is no "law" at all before the T2
agency supplies the "authoritative" interpretation of the statute; since there is
no law before T2, the law cannot have changed. I show that this argument is
incorrect. The TI court's interpretation is law, even if it is "provisional" instead
of "authoritative." Thus, retroactivity analysis of some kind is appropriate.
Second, the court must determine who changed the law. Without an
answer to this question, judges do not know which set of background
assumptions should be used, and therefore cannot determine which retroactivity
test is appropriate. If the agency has changed the law, Retail Union will be the
appropriate framework. If the court has changed the law, either Harper,
Chevron Oil, or Reynoldsville Casket will supply the rule. I show that the court,
and not the agency, has changed the law.
A. The Erie Connection
Even before Brand X was decided, Professor Bamberger had likened the
post-Chevron role of the federal agency to the post-Erie role of state courts and
116. Id. at 507-08.
117. Vartelas v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 1479, 1491 (2012) (citing Landgraf v. USI Film
Products, 511 U.S. 244, 269-70 (1994)).
118. See, e.g., Garfias-Rodriguez v. Holder, 702 F.3d 504, 530 (9th Cir. 2012) (en




legislatures.119 In both cases, either the agency or the state court is the
"authoritative" interpreter, and any first-in-time ruling by a federal court is
merely provisional. In both cases, the lack of "authoritative" interpretive power
is not itself grounds for a federal court to deny jurisdiction over the case at
T1.120 And, in both cases, the federal court's decision would stand as precedent
in the federal courts only so long as the "authoritative interpreter" had not yet
spoken to the question. On the whole, the analogy between Erie and Brand X is
both powerful and telling.
But it is simply not correct, as Professor Strauss has argued, that the two
situations are "quite the same."l21 On the contrary, there are a number of
important differences between Brand X and Erie. For example, in an Erie
analysis, the federal court is attempting to "predict" how the state court would
rule.122 But in a Brand X analysis, federal courts are not "predicting" how the
agency would rule but rather are rendering their own independent
interpretations of the statute. 123
The most important difference between Erie and Brand X, however, is
that a state court's opinion on a certified question of state law is immediately
binding on the federal court, whereas an administrative agency's opinion is
not.124 On the contrary, T3 federal courts retain final authority to reject any T2
agency interpretation that they find unreasonable. But a federal court could
never reject a state court of last resort's opinion on a matter of state law, even if
the federal court thought that interpretation to be clearly erroneous.
Some commentators have referred to the federal courts' role in
administrative law as one of "boundary setting." 25 Others have used the
analogy of a sports referee, who oversees and supervises but does not
participate.126 No matter the nomenclature, the point here is that federal courts
119. See, e.g., Bamberger, supra note 13, at 1307-11 (2002) (noting three years prior to
the Court's decision in Brand X that a first-in-time "court's choice of one reasonable construction of
regulatory statutes" is merely "provisional" or "interim" since it can be overridden by a second-in-time
agency).
120. Id. at 1307 (quoting Meredith v. Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 228, 234 (1943)); see
Watts, supra note 11, at 1020 & n. 135.
121. Peter L. Strauss, "Deference" Is Too Confusing-Let's Call Them "Chevron
Space" and "Skidmore Weight," 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1143, 1147(2012).
122. See Bradford R. Clark, Ascertaining the Laws of the Several States: Positivism and
Judicial Federalism After Erie, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 1459, 1461, 1466 (1997); Watts, supra note I1, at
1019 & n.126.
123. See Watts, supra note 11, at 1021-22.
124. Indeed, even agency views obtained through a Ventura remand must still be
ratified by the federal court before they become law.
125. Henry P. Monaghan, Marbury and the Administrative State, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1,
32-34 (1983); see Robert L. Stem, Review of Findings of Administrators, Judges and Juries: A
Comparative Analysis, 58 HARv. L. REV. 70, 106-07 (1944) (similar); see also Crowell v. Benson, 285
U.S. 22, 89-90 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) ("[T]he function of the courts is not one of review but
essentially of control-the function of keeping agencies within their statutory authority.").
126. Strauss, supra note 121, at 1150.
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serve as a critical check on administrative agencies. Thus, even during the
contemporary era of agency ascendancy, it remains true that "[a]n agency is not
an island entire of itself. It is one of the many rooms in the magnificent
mansion of the law."1 27
In the wake of United States v. Mead Corp., 128 the federal courts'
gatekeeping role has become even more robust. In modem administrative law,
the check on agencies provided by the federal courts serves a number of
important purposes. First and most importantly, the courts' review prevents
rules that are "procedurally defective, arbitrary or capricious in substance, or
manifestly contrary to the statute" from becoming law. 129 Courts also review
whether the agency has authority to interpret the statute in the first instance,
which is the only thing that prevents agencies from running wild and issuing
interpretations over statutes that they do not implement.130 And courts review
agency rules to make sure that those rules do not contradict previous court
opinions that have followed from "the unambiguous terms of the statute."' 3'
The health of these checks is essential, since without them Congress might
hesitate to delegate authority to agencies, even if such delegation would
otherwise be efficient.132
For these reasons, Chevron itself cemented the federal courts' gatekeeping
role by clarifying that these courts will always remain "the final authority on
issues of statutory construction." 33 Justice Stevens, the author of Chevron, has
since insisted that courts "have not abdicated [their] judicial role" in the wake
of Brand X.134 In his opinion, "[t]he fact that Congress has left a gap for the
agency to fill means that courts should defer to the agency's reasonable gap-
filling decisions, not that courts should cease to mark the bounds of delegated
agency choice." 35 Some commentators have insisted that the post-Chevron role
127. Louis L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 590 (1965).
128. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001).
129. Id. at 227.
130. See id.; Doug Geyser, Note, Courts Still "Say What the Law Is": Explaining the
Functions of the Judiciary and Agencies After Brand X, 106 COLUM. L. REv. 2129, 2166-67 (2006)
("[Ilt is still the judiciary that decides whether the agency has been delegated authority to act in the first
place."); see also Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984)
(noting that Chevron applies only to agency interpretations of those statutes "which [the agency]
administers").
131. See Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967,
982 (2005).
132. See, e.g., Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 68 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (Leventhal, J.,
concurring) ("Congress has been willing to delegate its legislative powers broadly-and courts have
upheld such delegation-because there is court review to assure that the agency exercises the delegated
power within statutory limits.").
133. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 n.9.
134. Negusie v. Holder, 555 U.S. 511, 530-31 (2009) (Stevens, J., concurring).
135. Id. at 531; accord Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 222 (2002) (noting that Mead
"indicated that whether a court should give [Chevron] deference depends in significant part upon the




of federal courts is even more robust than Justice Stevens imagines. On this
view, judicial "review of the agency's judgment within its Chevron space for
reasonableness . . . still ha[s] an element of statutory interpretation to it."l 36
These insights can hardly be overstated. Though federal courts are not
authoritative interpreters of ambiguous statutes, they are the final authority-
that is, they are the last-in-time interpreters. Unless and until the court ratifies
an agency construction, that construction is not the law. In this sense, Brand X
dealt a much less serious blow to the federal courts than did Erie. Even after
Brand X, "the judiciary fulfills its Marbury duty to 'say what the law is' by
defining the boundaries within which an agency may act."137
Thus, Bamberger's application of Erie principles to the Brand X problem
glosses over a critical role that courts retain even after the loss of power they
sustained in Brand X. It is not true, as he argues, that "the federal interpretation
is no longer binding" after an agency hands down an opinion that contravenes
the court's own.138 On the contrary, the first-in-time federal court interpretation
remains binding up until a third-in-time federal court approves the agency's
reading.
B. Did the Law "Change"?
When Garfias first took his case to the Ninth Circuit, the "authoritative
interpreter" of the Immigration and Nationality Act, the BIA, had not yet
provided a construction of the statute. In light of this situation, the government
argued that the agency's T2 opinion did not "change" the law in the manner
required to trigger retroactivity analysis. Under this theory, the T1 court's
opinion was a mere "non-authoritative interpretation" that had never truly been
"the law." In his Garfias dissent, Judge Paez noted that this argument was
"premised on the novel, and equally unsupported notion that judicial
interpretations of ambiguous statutes are not an authoritative statement of the
law where an agency with policymaking expertise has yet to issue its own
interpretation."' 39
On the contrary, the government's argument does find some support in
precedent. But so too does the argument of Garfias. Though Judge Paez's
treatment of this question was somewhat offhanded, in reality a meaningful
circuit split exists on the issue. Six circuits-the First, Fourth, Eighth, Ninth,
Tenth, and the District of Columbia-have held that administrative rules
"change" rather than "clarify" the law when they overturn prior circuit
136. Strauss, supra note 121, at 1162 (attributing this point to Professor Kevin Stack).
137. Geyser, supra note 130, at 2131-32.
138. Id. at 2154.
139. Garfias-Rodriguez v. Holder, 702 F.3d 504, 551 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc) (Paez,
J., dissenting).
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precedent. Two other circuits-the Third and the Seventh-have held that such
rules are "clarifications" rather than "changes."
The D.C. Circuit's approach is the most straightforward. Under that
framework, a new rule will be found to have changed the law if that rule "is
substantively inconsistent with a prior regulation, prior agency practice, or any
Court of Appeals decision rejecting a prior regulation or agency practice."l 40
The new rule will also be considered a change if it "reflects a substantive
change from the position taken by any of the Courts of Appeals and is likely to
increase liability."' 4' Applying Landgraf s assumption against retroactivity, the
D.C. Circuit went on to hold that such changes to the law cannot be applied
retroactively. 142
In a series of cases dealing with the United States Sentencing Guidelines,
four courts of appeals have agreed with the D.C. Circuit's reasoning. These
cases are not precisely analogous to the Brand X context, since they deal with
the Sentencing Commission's decision to correct a previous court interpretation
by amending the commentary for the Guidelines, rather than an agency's
decision to correct a prior court interpretation through a rulemaking or
adjudication. But many courts have suggested that the two situations are
basically identical, given that the actual text of the Guidelines is never altered.
Since only the commentary is amended, the Commission is basically issuing an
interpretation of the statute, just as an agency might do in an informal
rulemaking.
Consider, for example, the case of United States v. Chambers.143 There,
the Fourth Circuit interpreted the ambiguous word "manager" in the United
States Sentencing Guidelines to allow sentencing enhancements for members
of a conspiracy even if they did not exercise control over co-conspirators.'"
The Sentencing Commission then amended the commentary on the relevant
Guideline (but not the Guideline itself) to clarify that the word "manager"
meant that the defendant must have exercised control over co-conspirators in
order to receive the enhancement.145 In a case heard after that amendment, the
Fourth Circuit found that the amendment was "not a mere clarification because
it works a substantive change in the operation of the guideline in this circuit.
The amendment has the effect of changing the law in this circuit."" 6 In nearly
140. Nat'1 Mining Ass'n v. Dep't of Labor, 292 F.3d 849, 859-60 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
141. Id at 860.
142. Id.
143. United States v. Chambers, 985 F.2d 1263 (4th Cir. 1993).
144. Id. at 1268.
145. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3B1.1, application n.2 (effective Nov.
1, 1993).




identical cases, the First,147 Eighth,148 and Tenthl49 Circuits have reached
similar conclusions to the Chambers court.
The Third and Seventh Circuits have consistently disagreed. In the Levy II
case mentioned above, the Third Circuit noted that it does "not take the fact
that an amendment conflicts with a judicial interpretation of the pre-amendment
law to mean that the amendment is a substantive change and not just a
clarification."',50 Thus, in the Sentencing Guidelines cases, the Third Circuit has
found that "merely because the [first-in-time] courts were resolving an
ambiguity in the prior law by supplying a meaning that was neither stated in,
nor clear from, the language of the application note, does not mean that the new
wording has fashioned a substantive change in the Guidelines."' 5 1 For both the
Third and the Seventh Circuits, this conclusion is compelled by the fact that "it
is the text of the [thing being interpreted]-not the courts' gloss on that text-
that ultimately determines whether the amendment is a clarification or a
substantive revision."' 52
Another argument for the Third Circuit's position was persuasively
expressed by the Seventh Circuit in Pope v. Shalala, where the court held that
"[a] rule simply clarifying an unsettled or confusing area of the law . . . does
not change the law, but restates what the law according to the agency is and has
always been."' 5 3 Chief Judge Kozinski of the Ninth Circuit endorsed this view
in Garfias, noting that the case did not "merit retroactivity analysis because
Briones didn't change the law; it settled the law." 54 Chief Judge Kozinski
correctly noted that "Acosta's interpretation of the statutory ambiguity clarified
in Briones was provisional, not authoritative, for purposes of retroactivity
analysis."' 55 He was also correct to note that "[a]uthoritative interpreters
operate by the Highlander principle: 'There can be only one.""1
56
But none of this means that Garfias did not change the law. Garfias
adopted the Briones rule and overrode Acosta on October 19, 2012. On October
18, an alien who had entered the United States without inspection would have
been eligible for adjustment of status if he had litigated the issue in a federal
court within the Ninth Circuit. On October 20, the same litigant would have
147. United States v. Prezioso, 989 F.2d 52, 54 (1st Cir. 1993).
148. United States v. Reedy, 30 F.3d 1038, 1039 (8th Cir. 1994).
149. United States v. Saucedo, 950 F.2d 1508 (10th Cir. 1991), rev'don other grounds,
Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36 (1993).
150. Levy v. Sterling Holding Co., LLC (Levy II), 544 F.3d 493, 507 (3d Cir. 2008)
(citing United States v. Marmolejos, 140 F.3d 488, 492 (3d Cir. 1998)).
151. Marmolejos, 140 F.3d at 492.
152. Id.; United States v. Fones, 51 F.3d 663, 669 (7th Cir. 1995).
153. 998 F.2d 473, 483 (7th Cir. 1993).
154. Garfias-Rodriguez v. Holder, 702 F.3d 504, 530 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc)
(Kozinski, C.J., disagreeing with everyone).
155. Id. at 531.
156. Id.
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been ineligible for adjustment of status. Given these facts, the Garfias majority
correctly concluded that its opinion "brought about [a] change in the law." 5 7
Thus, in this circuit split, the six courts of appeals to find a "change" in
the law have the better of the argument. The position of the Third and Seventh
Circuits (and Chief Judge Kozinski) initially seems appealing, and certainly is
understandable. But this position's fatal flaw is its failure to account for the
possibility that a first-in-time court decision may simultaneously be both "the
law" and "not authoritative."
The Supreme Court's jurisprudence on the retroactive effect of agency
rules is instructive. In general, administrative rules cannot be applied
retroactively. But if the rule merely "clarifies" the law, it can be applied to past
conduct, since it does not upset settled expectations by "changing" the law.
Last Term, Justice Kennedy clarified this idea in his dissenting opinion in
United States v. Home Concrete & Supply.ss There, he noted that the
regulation at issue was not impermissibly retroactive since it "worked no
change in the law, and instead . . . interpreted a statutory provision without an
established meaning." 59 The phrase "established meaning" is key. In the Brand
X context, a T2 agency interpretation that contravenes a TI court opinion is not
writing on a blank slate. Instead, the TI court opinion represents the
"established meaning" of the statute until T2. That "established meaning,"
though provisional and not authoritative, provides the first step of the Brand X
dance.
The Court made the same point in a slightly different way in Smiley v.
Citibank.160 There, the majority found that it would pose no problem to apply a
new agency regulation to "transactions that occurred at a time when there was
no clear agency guidance."16I Again, there is a key phrase: "no clear agency
guidance." Only when there was "no clear agency guidance" before the rule
can it be said that there was "no law." Indeed, the Court has held this opinion
for decades. In 1936, for example, the Court unanimously rejected the
argument that a new regulation was impermissibly retroactive by noting that
the new regulation "pointed the way, for the first time, for correctly applying
the antecedent statute."1 62
Whether it is' called an "established meaning" or "clear guidance" or a
"first time" interpretation, the point here is the same: new agency regulations
are only excused from retroactivity analysis when they write on a blank slate.
157. Id. at 514 n.7 (majority opinion).
158. United States v. Home Concrete & Supply, LLC, 132 S. Ct. 1836 (2012).
159. Id. at 1853 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
160. Smiley v. Citibank (S.D.), N.A., 517 U.S. 735 (1996).
161. Id. at 744 n.3.





This is not the case in the Brand X context, since the TI court's "first-time"
interpretation does provide "clear guidance" and "an established meaning" on
which parties rely. Although the TI court's interpretation of a statute might
later be trumped by an agency construction at T2,163 that TI interpretation
ordered the behavior of the parties between TI and T2 and should therefore
affect the way in which a court thinks about retroactivity. 6 4
Put simply, provisional law is still the law. Admittedly, the force of that
law is weak: the precedential value of these first-in-time court decisions is
necessarily "limited to other courts within [the issuing court's] hierarchical
sphere of command and [is] defeated as soon as the [agency] . . . reache[s] a
differing, valid conclusion."l 65 But the point remains valid: unless and until an
agency overrules a court of appeals' interpretation of a statute, all courts within
that circuit are obligated to observe that interpretation and to provide it with
normal stare decisis effect. For this reason, the Garfias majority was right to
find that, if the BIA had never issued Briones, then "Acosta would still be good
law."l 66
In the end, the argument that Briones "settled" the law simply cannot be
squared with the role of the federal courts in the wake of Chevron. An agency
cannot override a court of appeals just by saying so. Under Chevron and Brand
163. Although the Third and Seventh Circuits take for granted the fact that any "non-
authoritative" interpretation will later be overridden by the agency, that assessment is far from true. The
agency may choose not to decide the question, or it may simply never get the opportunity to do so. In
either case, the court's "non-authoritative" interpretation will continue to control the outcome of cases
decided under that statute.
164. The justification for pure prospectivity for litigants acting between T2 and T3 is
somewhat different. It initially seems appealing to apply the rule of pure prospectivity only to litigants
acting between TI and T2, since they could not be sure whether the agency would ever issue a T2
opinion at all. On this reading, the T2 agency opinion places the litigant "on notice" that the TI court
opinion is in peril, and in so doing makes their further reliance on the TI judicial opinion unreasonable.
The flaw in this argument, however, is that the litigant cannot know for sure whether the T3 court will
ratify the T2 agency opinion. Especially considering that the TI court and the T2 agency have disagreed
about the meaning of the statute, there is significant ambiguity over what the T3 court will ultimately
decide. In certain situations, the TI court may have indicated that its opinion did not follow from the
clear language of the statute and that the agency should feel free to override that opinion at a later time.
In such cases, it might make sense to displace my presumption against retroactivity, since the litigant's
further reliance on TI after T2 could be seen as unreasonable. But it is very hard to know whether a TI
court is deciding based on the "unambiguous language of the statute" or merely on the basis of their best
guess as to the statute's meaning. See, e.g., United States v. Home Concrete & Supply, LLC, 132 S. Ct.
1836, 1844 (2012) (holding, perplexingly, that a TI court's decision did not follow the unambiguous
terms of the statute even though the TI court had expressly stated that the statute was "unambiguous").
165. Strauss, supra note 121, at 1172; see Watts, supra note 11, at 1015 ("If an agency
fails to exercise its congressionally-delegated interpretive powers, the courts remain free to impose their
own interpretation in the interim."); see also Bamberger, supra note 13, at 1276 (noting that first-in-time
court decisions should "have stare decisis effect," but "only until that agency sets forth its own
permissible interpretation in a manner binding on the judiciary"); id. at 1311 (similar).
166. Garfias-Rodriguez v. Holder, 702 F.3d 504, 515 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc); see id.
at 531 (Kozinski, C.J., disagreeing with everyone) ("We do, of course, set the law of the circuit, which is
binding on all the courts-until the agency speaks.").
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X, the court of appeals must instead override itself by adopting the agency's
interpretation.
C. Who Changed the Law?
Once it has been determined that the law has changed, courts are free to
advance to the second threshold question in the retroactivity analysis: who
changed it? Only after answering this question can the court know which
retroactivity test is appropriate to apply.
Despite the critical nature of this inquiry, the Garfias majority gave it
short treatment. The question is, no doubt, a difficult one. The majority itself
noted that "it is not clear for purposes of determining which retroactivity
analysis applies whether we or the agency effectively brought about the change
in the law."'68
Commentary from the legal academy has done less to hedge on this
question. Many have rallied to a rather black-and-white view: that, "[w]hen the
agency acts with the requisite formality under Mead to acquire Chevron
deference, it is changing the law."1 69
For the reasons explained in the Erie section above, this academic
consensus is in error. A third-in-time federal court confronted with the BrandX
problem should hold that it-the T3 court-is changing the law. This is the
only interpretation that remains faithful to both Chevron and Brand X. Indeed,
whether the court "adopt[s] a new rule because of changed views on a complex
analysis of underlying law, or because of a simple flash of insight accepted and
followed, or because of our duty to abide Supreme Court precedent, [the
court's] decision remains a judicial decision."170 The fact that the T3 court's
opinion ratifies a T2 agency decision does not change the inherently judicial
nature of the act. Rather, as Justice Stevens has argued, the court's opinion
demonstrates that "courts and agencies play complementary roles in the project
167. Id. at 533 (Gould, J., concurring) ("Indeed, although Brand X characterizes the
subsequent and contrary agency interpretation here as authoritative, the BIA's interpretation does not
become binding in this circuit until we defer to that interpretation."); see id. ("[I]t is our court that is
announcing a new rule of law for our circuit, not the BIA.").
168. Id. at 514 n.7.
169. Geyser, supra note 130, at 2166 (emphasis added); see id. at 2165 ("[W]hen an
agency acts in a manner entitled to Chevron deference, it is not reinterpreting the law in the face of a
prior federal court construction; rather, the agency is changing the very body of law that needs to be
interpreted, in the same fashion as Congress could do itself.").
170. Garfias-Rodriguez, 702 F.3d at 533 (Gould, J., concurring) (emphasis added);
accord id. at 546 (Paez, J., dissenting). Although it does not say so explicitly, even the Garias majority
implicitly admits that it is the court, and not the agency, that changed the law. Buried in a footnote is the
majority's admission that the court, and not the agency, "retain[s] ultimate authority to determine





of statutory interpretation" and that "[s]tatutory language may thus admit of
both judicial construction and agency exposition."' 7'
In Garfias, the Ninth Circuit ultimately decided that Retail Union
provided the proper framework, and noted that it would treat the case "as we
would if the agency had changed its own rules."l 72 In so holding, the majority
did not directly say that the agency rather than the court had changed the law;
in fact, the majority noted in a cryptic footnote that it did "not mean to say ...
that the agency changed the law of this circuit." 73 In the majority's view,
Retail Union was appropriate not because the agency had changed the law, but
rather because the Retail Union test "allows us to take into account the
intricacies of a Brand X problem, which are typically absent in a case where we
have overruled our own decisions," such as Chevron Oil.174
It is not immediately evident why the Brand X situation is more similar to
Retail Union than to Chevron Oil. In both Retail Union and Chevron Oil, the
law rests where the final decisionmaker thinks it should be. In the Brand X
situation, the law does not rest where the final decisionmaker (the court) thinks
it should be. Rather, it rests where the agency thinks it should be. Thus, Retail
Union and Chevron Oil are more similar to one another than either is to
Garfias.
Once this explanation is taken off the table, it becomes clear that the Ninth
Circuit's decision to adopt Retail Union for the BrandX context was little more
than an ad hoc choice designed to arrive at the result that the court preferred.
This is clear from the majority's reasoning, which ran together the discrete
questions "who changed the law" and "which test should apply."l 75 The panel
may have been right that Chevron Oil was not "well adapted to the Brand X
situation" and that it did not seem to be "the appropriate framework."' 76 But
this analysis begs the question. The majority decided which test it wanted to
apply based only on its subjective view of the equities.
The real work in Garfias is being done by the court's conclusion that
Retail Union is "more flexible than Chevron Oil." The Chevron Oil test might
require a hard-and-fast rule that would apply to Garfias and all litigants
similarly situated, whereas Retail Union would allow for a case-by-case
analysis. The majority may have worried that, if it adopted the Chevron Oil
test, it would have been compelled to issue a judgment with retroactive
implication for all litigants who had relied on Acosta. After all, Garfias was an
171. Negusie v. Holder, 555 U.S. 511, 530-31 (2009) (Stevens, J., concurring).
172. Garfias-Rodriguez, 702 F.3d at 533 (majority opinion).
173. Id. at 514 n.7 (internal quotations omitted).
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extraordinarily unsympathetic litigant who relied on Acosta significantly less
than other litigants who were absent but similarly situated."'
IV. Defending Pure Prospectivity
It is certainly true, as the Court noted in Rivers v. Roadway Express, that
the "essence of judicial decisionmaking . . . necessarily involves some peril to
individual expectations."1 78 But Brand X takes that peril to a new level. Its
basic premise-that a court will be required to overrule prior precedent despite
the fact that this precedent is not wrong-presents a whole class of recurring
retroactivity problems that would have been unimaginable only a generation
ago.
In this Part, I argue that a T3 federal court ratifying a T2 agency
interpretation should usually apply its decision prospectively only. This
approach can be justified under either the remedial conception or the choice-of-
law conception of prospectivity.
Before diving into the nuances of this argument, a quick note on timing
may be warranted. Suppose again that a court makes the law A at TI, that the
agency offers interpretation B at T2, and that a court makes the law B at T3
with citation to Brand X. My argument is that law B should not apply to any
litigant who acted at any time between T1 and T3. To be sure, the equitable
interests are most persuasive for those who acted between TI and T2; these
litigants could not be sure whether the agency would ever exercise its authority
to issue the T2 interpretation at all, and were therefore reasonable in relying on
the court's construction at TI. The case for applying law B to litigants who
acted between T2 and T3 is admittedly stronger, since those who acted during
this period should have been on notice that the agency had issued T2 and that
law B might soon become the law of the circuit under Brand X. Still, law B
should not attach to conduct between T2 and T3, since litigants could not be
sure whether the court at T3 would ratify the agency's decision at T2. Given
the fact that the TI court and the T2 agency disagreed over the meaning of the
statute, it is truly unclear for those acting between T2 and T3 what the T3 court
will ultimately say.179 Unless and until the T3 court ratifies the agency's T2
interpretation, all litigants would be reasonable in relying on law A.
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177. See supra note 101. The Ninth Circuit's choice of Retail Union may also have
been an attempt to avoid the uncertainty surrounding Chevron Oil.
178. 511 U.S. 298, 312 (1994).
179. See supra note 164.
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BrandX
A. Understanding the Equities
Those who believe in prospectivity are occasionally willing to withhold
retroactive application of a new rule of law when such retroactivity would
"produce substantial inequitable results" or otherwise result in "injustice or
hardship."s If a T3 court applied law B against a litigant who acted while the
law was A, substantial inequities would result. This is true for several reasons.
First and most importantly, the application of law B to a litigant acting
between TI and T3 would unjustly penalize that litigant for relying on a TI
court decision that, in the words of the Brand X Court, was not "legally
wrong." 1 This distinguishes the Brand X problem from normal cases of
judicial retroactivity, which involve appellate courts overturning lower courts
that were "legally wrong." Thus, litigants acting in reliance on the TI court's
opinion that the law is A have behaved much more reasonably than those who
relied on either (1) nothing at all or (2) a poorly reasoned or otherwise "legally
wrong" opinion. It makes sense to protect this doubly reasonable reliance by
differentiating the Brand X problem from other cases of judicial
decisionmaking.
Second, the mere potential that the T3 court's opinion might apply
retroactively would force litigants to wait in a cruel limbo while the T2 agency
decides whether or not it wants to disagree with the TI court's construction of a
statute. The formalistic application of Harper's retroactivity presumption
would force litigants to wait indefinitely on an agency interpretation of a statute
that may never come. That wait might last years.182 Indeed, since agencies are
not obligated to respond to judicial decisions, the wait might last forever.
Finally, an option for pure prospectivity would promote fairness by
allowing courts to treat the ex ante situation of statutory ambiguity differently
from the ex ante presence of a clear rule. The Supreme Court has indicated
180. Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701, 706 (1969) (quoting Great Northern
R.R. Co. v. Sunburst Oil & Refining Co., 287 U.S. 358, 364 (1932)); see Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404
U.S. 97, 107 (1971).
181. Nat'l Cable & Telecommunications Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S.
967, 983 (2005).
182. Suppose, for example, that a court of appeals issues an opinion allowing a certain
class of aliens to adjust status, but does not indicate whether its new interpretation of the INA follows
from the unambiguous words of the statute. Suppose further that, fifty years down the line, the BIA
exercises its authority to overrule this decision, and that the T3 federal court defers to that interpretation
under Brand X. Surely most observers would agree that it would be extremely unjust to apply the
agency's new rule to a litigant who sought to adjust status forty-nine years after the TI opinion. But this
is exactly what a strict application of Harper would mandate, so long as the litigant's application to
adjust status was still open at the time of the T3 decision. In order to avoid that inequity, courts should
adopt a default rule of pure prospectivity, so that litigants can act in the indefinite period between TI
and T3 without having to fear that they may ultimately be hoodwinked by Harper.
183. But see Morales-Izquierdo v. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 600 F.3d 1076, 1089 (9th
Cir. 2010) .("[S]tatutory ambiguity alone has never been sufficient to render judicial interpretation of a
statute non-retroactive."); id. at 1090 ("[A] subsequent judicial interpretation of the same statute based
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on numerous occasions that retroactive application of a new rule may be
inappropriate when the litigant had relied on a clear precedent that has been
overturned; on the contrary, retroactivity raises fewer problems with the ex ante
situation is one of sheer ambiguity. The Brand X problem is by definition an
example of the former situation, since the litigant will have relied on some rule
when she took action. This was the situation in Garfias, since the Ninth
Circuit's "decision to overrule Acosta amount[ed] to a complete reversal of a
settled rule of law upon which a vulnerable class of litigants reasonably and
detrimentally relied."l 84
Detractors of the pure prospectivity approach will likely argue that
employing Chevron Oil gives too much protection to litigants. Indeed, some
commentators have already suggested that, in the wake of Brand X, litigants
should be "on notice" that a TI court's interpretation of a federal statute might
later be overturned by the T2 agency. Given that reality, it might be said that no
reliance is reasonable unless the court's constructions followed from the
unambiguous terms of the statute-that is, unless the court's construction was
made at Chevron step one. In the same vein, others have argued that litigants
would be especially misguided if they relied on a TI court's decision despite
the fact that this decision has been contravened by pre-T1 agency guidance or
by pre-TI agency decisions that, while formal, concern only a related statutory
provision.
There are a few problems with these arguments.s It may be true that an
agency's related adjudications send signals as to how the agency might rule if
it, and not the court of appeals, had provided the first-in-time interpretation.
But reliance on prior agency adjudications is inherently less reasonable than
reliance on prior court decisions. This is true because stare decisis binds courts
but not agencies. After FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., agencies are free
to change their own rules whenever they want, so long as they are moving from
one reasonable rule to another.186 Indeed, in Brand X itself, the Court noted that
"[a]gency inconsistency is not a basis for declining to analyze the agency's
interpretation under the Chevron framework."18 7
on Brand X deference is no less precedential simply because it relied on agency expertise that was not
available to the earlier judicial panel.").
184. Garfias-Rodriguez v. Holder, 702 F.3d 504, 553 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc) (Paez,
J., dissenting).
185. The "stare decisis" argument provided here applies mainly to litigants acting
between TI and T2. For a discussion of why retroactivity is inappropriate for litigants acting between T2
and T3, see note 164 and accompanying text.
186. FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 515 (2009). Agencies cannot
change positions sub silentio, and they must display an awareness that they are changing the law. Id.
187. Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 981
(2005); see, e.g., Epilepsy Found. of Ne. Ohio v. NLRB, 268 F.3d 1095, 1097 (D.C. Cir.





Therefore, Garfias had no way to know how the BIA would construe the
INA if it were given a chance to do so. The BIA is a perfect example of agency
unpredictability. This agency is composed of fifteen members who are each
appointed by the Attorney General. During the George W. Bush administration,
the appointment procedure was criticized for being highly politicized.' At any
given time during this period-the period in which Garfias was litigating-the
composition of the BIA could have shifted. With that shift, the BIA might have
moved away from a previous precedent. Given that reality, it is simply not fair
to suggest that Garfias should have taken hints from the BIA's previous
decisions in this area.
B. Why Brand X Is Different
Although the Supreme Court has never squarely held that pure
prospectivity is unconstitutional, it has on several occasions hinted that this
may be the case. In the Court's opinions on point, two distinct arguments have
emerged against pure prospectivity. The first of these arguments, advanced by
Justice Scalia, is that the Constitution empowers judges only to "say what the
law is," and not to prescribe "what the law will be." The second argument
against pure prospectivity is simply that it promotes judicial activism.190 In this
Section, I rebut these two legal arguments, focusing in particular on how Brand
X upsets their theoretical underpinnings. I hope to show that the unique
idiosyncrasies of the Brand X problem make pure prospectivity a valid legal
technique in the administrative-law context, even if that technique remains
dubious in other legal theaters.
I begin with Justice Scalia's argument, since it seems to have garnered the
most support in the lower courts. This line of reasoning is premised on the
important and oft-invoked legal fiction that a statute has only ever meant one
thing. 91 The premise here is that when one court overrides a previous court's
construction of the law, that previous construction disappears into the ether.
188. See, e.g., OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN. & OFFICE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY,
U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, AN INVESTIGATION OF ALLEGATIONS OF POLITICIZED HIRING BY MONICA
GOODLING AND OTHER STAFF IN THE OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 68 (2008),
http://www.justice.gov/oig/special/s0807/final.pdf.
189. See FALLON ET AL., FEDERAL COURTS, supra note 63, at 54 (noting that "the
Court has not resolved [this] question directly").
190. See James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529, 536-37 (1991)
(Souter, J., opinion for the Court).
191. A slightly different way of phrasing this argument is that pure prospectivity
creates "advisory opinions" that are ultra vires of the federal courts' Article III powers. See Teague v.
Lane, 489 U.S. 228, 316 (1989) (implying that pure prospectivity is similar to "rendering advisory
opinions"). This argument has been persuasively discredited elsewhere. See, e.g., Teague, 489 U.S. at
318 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); FALLON ET AL., FEDERAL COURTS,
supra note 63, at 55 (noting that this argument "may not be tenable" in light of the prevalence of the
"harmless error" doctrine); Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 29, at 1798-1800.
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Everyone then pretends that the previous construction never existed. The one
"true meaning" of the statute is the one that the court now adopts, and
retroactive application of that rule presents no problem since the statute has
always meant the same thing (even when it meant something else).
This "one meaning" fiction has long been the subject of vigorous debate.
Writing more than fifty years ago, Justice Frankfurter insisted that judges
"should not indulge in the fiction that the law now announced has always been
the law."192 The thinking here is that it would be much "more conducive to
law's self-respect to recognize candidly the considerations that give prospective
content to a new pronouncement of law."193 Others, such as Justice Scalia, have
made the "one meaning" fiction a central part of their retroactivity
jurisprudence. For Justice Scalia, this fiction is a way of avoiding prospectivity.
In his view, "[p]rospective decisionmaking is the handmaid of judicial
activism, and the born enemy of stare decisis."l94
Alas, Justice Scalia's declaratory theory of law is ill-adapted for the post-
Brand X world. In Morales-Izquierdo v. Department of Homeland Security, the
Ninth Circuit noted that it is easy for modem courts
to accept that the first time a court interprets an ambiguous statute, it is saying
what the statute has always meant. ... It is similarly plausible that when a
superordinate court overrules the interpretation of an ambiguous statute by an
inferior court, the superordinate court is correcting an "erroneous" interpretation
of the statute and reaffirming what the statute has always meant. . . . But when a
court overrules its own prior interpretation of an ambiguous statute in deference
to an interpretation by an agency-an agency that lacks the constitutional
authority to overrule the court's prior interpretation-the fiction that the statute
has always meant one particular thing may appear to break down. 195
Even after noting this "break down," the Morales-Izquierdo panel applied
Harper anyway. In so doing, the panel noted that its legal fiction, though "ill
equipped for a Brand X reality," was not so bad; all it did, in the end, was set
up a situation that "is not markedly different from the case in which a federal
court's interpretation of an ambiguous state law is overridden by a conflicting
but authoritative interpretation of that law by a state court of last resort."l 96 Yet
again, the court copped out of the difficult legal quandary by analogizing to the
Erie doctrine. But, as noted above, Erie is less analogous than it first seems.
192. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 26 (1956) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
193. Id.
194. Harper v. Va. Dep't of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86, 105 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring).
195. Morales-Izquierdo v. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 600 F.3d 1076, 1088-89 (9th Cir.
2010) (citations omitted).




The very premise of the "one meaning" fiction-that judges "find" the
law as it has always existed-is ill-suited for the Brand X situation, in which
agencies "create" the law. The first articulation of the "one meaning" fiction
was provided by William Blackstone in his Commentaries on the Laws of
England. There, Blackstone argued that statutes are laden with meaning even
before judicial interpretation, and that judges merely "find" or "vindicate" that
meaning.197 Given the weight that modem judges place on evolving social
mores, "[i]t would be only a slight exaggeration to say that there are no more
Blackstonians."l 98 Indeed, the Blackstonian perception is at odds with the
circumscribed role of T3 federal judges faced with the Brand X problem: they
can only approve or deny the construction that the agency has provided.
Modem judges are not "finding" anything when conducting Chevron review,
and they are not engaged in some Platonic search for the one true meaning of a
statute. Indeed, their one and only job is to decide whether the agency's
interpretation is reasonable.
The second major argument against pure prospectivity is that it promotes
judicial activism by "relax[ing] the force of precedent [and] minimizing the
costs of overruling," thus allowing "the courts to act with a freedom
comparable to that of legislatures." But this argument also makes little sense
in a post-Brand X world, given that "the plain import of Brand X is the
liberation of courts (and agencies) from stare decisis." 200 Indeed, Brand X
requires courts to abandon stare decisis and overrule past precedents, even
though those precedents are "legally correct." The modem reality-for better or
worse-is that the strength of judicial precedent is at a historically low ebb. But
the culprit here is not the tool of pure prospectivity, but rather the Brand X
decision itself. The judges who do use pure prospectivity in a post-Brand X
world are simply following the Supreme Court's instructions. They are not
power-hungry activists. Put differently, third-in-time federal courts engaged in
Brand X analysis simply do not have the type of judicial "freedom" that
worried Justice Souter in Beam. On the contrary, they have only two options:
ratify the agency's interpretation or reject it.
197. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *69 (3d ed. 1884) ("[J]udges do not
pretend to make a new law, but to vindicate the old one from misrepresentation."); see THOMAS
COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS *91 (1868) ("[lt is said that which distinguishes a judicial
from a legislative act is, that the one is a determination of what the existing law is in relation to some
existing thing already done or happened, while the other is a predetermination of what the law shall be
for the regulation of all future cases."); Morales-Izquierdo, 600 F.3d at 1088 (noting "the ancient, but
still powerful, legal fiction that statutes have content before they are interpreted by courts, and that
courts 'find' that preexisting content").
198. Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 29, at 1759.
199. James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529, 536-37 (1991) (Souter, J.,
opinion for the Court); see id. at 547-48 (1991) (Blackmun, J., concurring); id. at 549 (Scalia, J.,
concurring in the judgment); James v. United States, 366 U.S. 213, 225 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting).
200. Geyser, supra note 130, at 2152.
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V. A Default Rule for the BrandXProblem
Academics have long sought a workable way to protect litigants from the
aggressive retroactive rulemaking of agencies such as the BIA and the IRS.
Some have suggested that Brand X should simply not apply to the BIA,2 0 1
while others have suggested that Chevron deference is inappropriate for the
IRS.202 These solutions are nice in theory, but at bottom propose unprincipled
exceptions to the law of agency deference in hopes of achieving their
preferred normative outcome. My suggestion for protecting these litigants is
much simpler: federal courts should embrace pure prospectivity and revive
Chevron Oil. When conducting the Chevron Oil analysis, courts should adopt a
default presumption in favor of the litigant who acted between TI and T3 in
reliance on the TI court's decision.
Under the default rule I propose, courts would begin by applying the basic
Chevron Oil balancing test. But, when applying that test, courts should also use
a presumption in favor of pure prospectivity. This presumption would resolve
the retroactivity question in favor of the litigant whenever the balancing test is
inconclusive or when there is insufficient information on any of the test's
prongs. For those employing a choice-of-law theory, this presumption would
also require pure prospectivity when the particular litigant "fails" the Chevron
Oil test but the class of litigants affected by the ruling would "pass" it.203 This
requirement follows from Beam's instruction that federal courts conduct a
"generalized enquiry" under which litigants can assert their own equitable and
reliance interests and also those of "all parties absent but similarly situated." 204
In the Brand X context, it is much better to be overinclusive than
underinclusive. The occasional need to excuse an unsympathetic litigant from
retroactivity is far outweighed by the aggregated equitable interests of all those
similarly situated.
The great advantage of Chevron Oil is that it concisely identifies the two
operative factors that most courts agree are relevant to the retroactivity inquiry:
potential inequities for the litigant and the ongoing integrity of the statute.205
Perhaps because of its utility as a brush-clearing tool, Chevron Oil has
201. Darren H. Weiss, Note, X Misses the Spot. Fernandez v. Keisler and the
(Mis)appropriation oflBrand X by the Board ofImmigration Appeals, 17 GEO. MASON L. REv. 889, 892
(2010).
202. Pruitt, supra note 17, at 1590-91.
203. This, for example, was the case for Garfias himself. See supra note 101.
204. Beam, 501 U.S. at 543 (Souter, J., opinion for the Court).
205. The first and third factors in the Chevron Oil test are really the same inquiry: so
long as the law has been changed, it will usually be inequitable to retroactively apply it to the litigant.
See Garfias-Rodriguez, 702 F.3d at 551 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc) (Paez, J., dissenting) ("Our precedent
suggests that, in the usual case, where the first factor is met, so is the third, because inequity necessarily
results from litigants' reliance on a past rule of law."); see also Holt v. Shalala, 35 F.3d 376, 380-81




206remained good law for almost thirty years. The problem with Chevron Oil,
on the other hand, is that the opinion does no't tell a court what to do when
these two factors point in opposite directions (as they almost always do). In the
absence of any guidance from the Supreme Court, lower courts have struggled
to weigh the two factors. Some courts have engaged in ad hoc balancing tests,
finding that one factor or another is "the most important."207 Others have
eschewed the entire concept of a balancing test, and have said that a
particularly persuasive answer to any one of the Chevron Oil factors should be
"dispositive[]."208 Still others have surveyed circuit precedent and determined
that, as a general pattern, the equitable considerations in the Chevron Oil test
seem to "outweigh[]" any concern for the health of the statute.209
How can this problem be fixed? Ironically, the answer might lie with
Retail Union. Although the five-part Retail Union test is clunky and confusing,
it does provide one valuable tool: a default presumption.210 By importing Retail
Union's presumption in favor of the litigant, courts applying Chevron Oil will
finally be able to reach predictable results.
Even after adopting the default rule I propose, courts applying Chevron
Oil would be free to allow retroactivity if, after considering "the prior history of
the rule in question [and] its purpose and effect," they conclude that
"retrospective operation will . . . retard" the rule's operation.211 In some cases,
the T2 agency may have a strong opinion about whether or not retroactivity
would truly retard the rule's operation. If that is the case, then a court
conducting Chevron Oil analysis could provide Skidmore deference to the
agency's opinion.212 After all, agencies may have a comparative advantage over
courts in analyzing how badly pure prospectivity would damage a rule that they
must administer. If agencies make an express finding that retroactivity would
harm the operation of the rule, that finding may be owed Skidmore
deference.213
How would this default presumption work in practice? Consider once
more the case of Garfias. Under the test I propose, Garfias would ha've been
206. Although Chevron Oil has been overruled to the extent that it calls for a case-by-
case approach to retroactivity, the Court has never signaled that its basic premise is invalid. Nor has the
Court overruled Chevron Oil writ large, even when given the opportunity to do so.
207. Jackson v. Bank of Hawaii, 902 F.2d 1385, 1390 (9th Cir. 1990).
208. Gibson v. United States, 781 F.2d 1334, 1339 (9th Cir. 1986).
209. Int'l Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. Aloha Airlines, Inc., 790 F.2d
727, 736 (9th Cir. 1986).
210. Watson, supra note 19, at 257.
211. Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 106-07 (1971).
212. See Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).
213. But probably not Chevron deference, since the question of whether retroactivity
would further the purpose of the rule is not itself an interpretation of the statute. When it comes to the
actual balancing test itself, agencies should not get deference, since they have no comparative advantage
over courts in balancing equities.
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excused from the retroactive application of the Briones rule. In my view, the
Ninth Circuit's approach-an approach that resulted in a removal order against
Garfias despite the fact that the equitable considerations "strongly favor[ed]"
him 214-iS unworkable and unjust.
The Chevron Oil test asks courts to balance inequities posed to litigants
against the harm that would be done to the new rule.215 In Garfias, the
inequities quite clearly outweighed the harm done to the rule. Garfias and those
similarly situated paid thousands of dollars in legal and application fees in
reliance on Acosta. And, more importantly, many undocumented immigrants
came out of hiding in reliance on Acosta. The government now proposes to
deport all of those litigants after having lured them into the open with the false
promise of a chance at citizenship. A more unjust situation could hardly be
imagined. As to the second prong of the test, allowing a limited number of
undocumented immigrants to adjust status does no major violence to the INA.
The BIA's interpretation will reign for all future cases. Thus, under my
approach, the equities clearly outweigh the harm to the rule, and retroactivity
would be deemed inappropriate.
Even if courts find that my proposed solution to the Brand X problem
goes too far, one less drastic option is available: adopting the same default rule,
but applying it only when the litigant's constitutional rights have been
implicated.
Consider, for example, the case of Flavio Nunez-Reyes. In 2001, Nunez-
Reyes was arrested in California for possession of methamphetamine. He was
given the option of either receiving a jury trial or pleading guilty and
completing a drug treatment program. California law provided that if he
completed this program, his conviction would be expunged.
216In Lujan-Armendariz v. INS, the Ninth Circuit had held that the Equal
Protection Clause required federal courts to treat expungement of a state
conviction in the same manner as expungement of a federal conviction. An
expunged federal conviction has no adverse immigration consequences. Thus,
in reliance on Lujan-Armendariz, Nunez-Reyes waived his right to a jury trial
and pled guilty to the drug conviction. His understanding was that his plea
would not alter his federal immigration status or otherwise alert federal
authorities to his unlawful presence in the United States.
Two years after Lujan-Armendariz was handed down, the BIA presented a
contrary interpretation of the statute.217 And, eight years after that, the Ninth
214. 702 F.3d 504, 523; accord Carrillo de Palacios v. Holder, 708 F.3d 1066, 1072
(9th Cir. 2013).
215. Chevron Oil, 404 U.S. at 106-07.
216. 222 F.3d 728, 732 (9th Cir. 2000), overruled by Nunez-Reyes v. Holder, 646 F.3d
684 (9th Cir. 2011).




Circuit decided in Nunez-Reyes v. Holder to overrule Lujan-Armendariz in
deference to the BIA.218
The Ninth Circuit then conducted the now-familiar retroactivity analysis.
After deciding that the Chevron Oil test was the proper framework, the court
found that retroactive application of their new rule to Nunez-Reyes would
clearly be unjust. In their view, "[i]t would be manifestly unfair effectively to
hoodwink aliens into waiving their constitutional rights on the promise of no
legal consequences and, then, to hold retroactively that their convictions
actually carried with them the particularly severe penalty of removal." 219
When the Ninth Circuit confronted the facts in Garfias, they were forced
to determine whether retroactivity analysis would is appropriate under BrandX,
and, if so, under precisely what conditions. While the en banc panel struggled
between the Retail Union test and the Chevron Oil test, Judge Gould was
already a step ahead. Having correctly concluded that Chevron Oil was the
proper framework, he wondered whether some bright line rule could be used to
resolve certain classes of Brand X cases. In hopes of crafting that rule, Judge
Gould drew a clear distinction between the facts of Garfias and those of Nunez-
Reyes:
[U]nlike in Nunez-Reyes where there was detrimental reliance because the alien
waived important constitutional rights by relying on Lujan-Armendariz which
we then overruled, [in Garfias] the main interest implicated is the alien's
prerogative to continue to conceal his unlawful presence, an interest that, the
majority points out, is of no legal significance.... For these reasons, I conclude
that our decision today should apply retroactively, hence my concurrence in the
majority's result.22
0
This language stops short of suggesting a bright line rule for cases in
which a constitutional right has been forfeited, but it does imply that almost all
such cases will result in a finding of pure prospectivity. In truth, the adoption of
a bright line rule would be both workable and just. After all, the greatest
possible reliance interest is one that leads a litigant to forfeit a constitutional
right.
VI. Conclusion
More than seventy years ago, the Supreme Court observed that "[t]he past
cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration." 221 Those words took on
218. 646 F.3d 684, 692 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc).
219. Id. at 694 (internal quotation marks omitted).
220. Garfias-Rodriguez v. Holder, 702 F.3d 504, 533 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc) (Gould,
J., concurring).
221. Chicot Cnty. Drainage Dist. v. Baxter State Bank, 308 U.S. 371, 374 (1940).
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a renewed meaning in light of Brand X, and to pretend otherwise would upset
basic notions of fundamental fairness and judicial efficiency. Though the Ninth
Circuit's decision in Garfias-Rodriguez v. Holder evinces an admirable concern
with finding an equitable solution to the Brand X problem, so too does that
opinion show the dangers of attempting to solve that problem by using tired
tools of retroactivity analysis. Luckily, these dangers can be easily avoided if
federal courts revive Chevron Oil and apply a presumption of pure
prospectivity when confronted with the BrandXproblem.
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